Born This Way

So one subject that keeps getting discussed in the gay marriage debate is whether or not homosexuality is innate. Gay advocates argue that if it is (and the evidence seems to be that it is), then homosexuals are being discriminated against for something they did not choose.
However, it has always seemed to me that this question - of whether homosexuality is innate - is a red herring. In fact, while it's an interesting scientific question, it has no bearing on whether or not homosexuals have the right to engage in their preferred lifestyle.
Suppose (as is almost certainly the case) that homosexuality is innate. Why should this give homosexuals the right to engage in their lifestyle? After all, many mental disorders are innate, but that doesn't mean that a psychopath has the right to go out and kill people. Someone who has a mental disorder that causes them to engage in immoral behavior has one of two options: either overcome the disorder, or be removed from society. This is regardless of whether the disorder is curable or not. And one can't say "God made me this way", because God made people with destructive mental disorders too.
And what if it isn't innate? Well, neither are most lifestyles people choose. We aren't born, for example, to live a certain religious lifestyle: we choose it (or are forced into it). But as long as lifestyle isn't hurting others, it does not concern them (obviously, there ARE some cases where a lifestyle might be hurting the person engaged in it in a way that is of concern to society as a whole). This is the important point. The question isn't whether one was born homosexual or chose the lifestyle: it's whether people have the right to behave the way they would like as long as it doesn't hurt others (offense doesn't count). This is why I'm an ally.

* * *

While I'm on the subject of bad arguments for causes I support, let's talk about abortion. I am pro-choice in a fuzzy way: I believe that the abortion of, say, a week-old embryo is completely blameless regardless of circumstances, partial-birth abortions are immoral unless for extreme medical reasons, and the time in between is one big gray fuzzy mess. I discuss my views in detail here.
So, obviously, I do not agree with the pro-lifers. However, I think the argument that a woman has the right to do what she wants with her body completely misses the point. It is the pro-lifers who are actually talking about what matters in this case: namely, whether the fetus is a human life. My beliefs are that it isn't (until fairly late in its development), and this is why I think abortion is OK. But if it is, then it seems to me that a woman's right to choose becomes questionable at best. It is intuitively likely that one's right to choose what to do with one's body stops at the point that that choice entails killing another human being. We could justify it on utilitarian grounds that the psychological and physical distress of carrying and giving birth to the child outweighs the value of its life (which is how I'd look at it): but even in this case the woman's right to choose is only considered relative to the what the value is of the human to be destroyed.

A Short Essay on Morality with Respect to Groups. (my respects to Bertrand Russell)

Humans are tribal animals. This is apparent in primitive societies, and it is apparent in our society. We have a deep seated need to attach ourselves to some group (and often to exclude and regard with suspicion those separate from our group). I myself happily associate myself with a number of groups.

Morality's fundamental purpose is in promoting the welfare of whatever group with which we are concerned, including the "group" that includes our individual selves.

However, we need to recognize that these groups into which we divide ourselves are arbitrary and dependent on custom, if we are to survive. What we need to do is determine which ways of dividing humanity into groups have objective significance. From a moral standpoint, these should be the only ways of dividing up humanity that should be of any importance.

I'll define a grouping with objective significance as one whose boundaries are more clearly and distinctly defined than any other way of grouping; where there is very little fuzziness and almost no examples of something that is "in between" the two groups. This leads to three groupings that have objective significance:
The Individual
Man or Woman
Humanity as a Whole
Now "Man or Woman" would not have moral importance as it is merely biological distinction, and although women and men are on average different, there is overlap in their abilities, needs, wants, etc...everything that is important to morality. Therefore from now on the only groups whose welfare we should consider when contemplating moral questions are those of the individual and of humanity as a whole. I feel that these two groups are equally important: humanity's needs don't in general override those of the individual, and the individual's needs don't in general override those of humanity.

Justice or Revenge?

So the whole thing with the Libyan bomber in Scotland got me thinking about "justice". For instance, some relatives of the victims are saying things like "he showed no mercy to the hundreds of people he killed, so he deserves no mercy"--a fairly common notion in regards to "justice". But is such a sentiment a good thing?

Let's make clear what we're talking about. There IS a meaning of justice with which I have no issue: the justice that demands that people be not be treated wrongly. I.e., a "just" trial, "justice" for those who were enslaved, etc. This is what I'll call "positive justice": at it's core is the assertion that those who have been dealt pain deserve to be given pleasure. But there is also "negative justice", which is the type of justice I wish to discuss: the assertion that those who have dealt pain deserve to have pain dealt to them. Now, it could also be argued that this form of justice is positive in the sense that it gives pleasure to those who have been dealt pain to know that the person who dealt them pain suffer. This assertion has two difficulties:

1. Justice implies "rightness", and it is not always true that what we want is "right". We can't be true that people's desire for pain to be caused to those who caused them pain is "right".
2. Imagine we could take, say, Hitler, and, without expending any effort or money, have him taken care of at a luxury resort. However, we tell the world that he is being cruelly punished, and it is somehow absolutely impossible that anyone will ever find out the truth. Therefore, everyone gets the pleasure of knowing that he is suffering (ref. Bertrand Russel). Chances are, considering this hypothetical situation, most people's immediate reaction is that justice has not been served.

Therefore negative justice is more than positive justice in regards to those who the subject wronged.

However, at its fundamentals, this type of justice is absolutely identical to revenge: A caused pain, therefore A deserves to be dealt pain. The only difference is that justice is assumed to be enacted by or in regards to some authority or principle (the Law, God, Karma, Moral Accounting, etc.). This makes it "right".

I don't see how such a sentiment can be a good thing.

CONTROVERSY TIME: Abortion

Alright, so obviously, I am writing a blog post when I promised I wouldn't. So the deal is now: no Free Will Part 2 until someone makes a comment that get's discussion going.

There was a poll on FB that went like this:
When does a human's life actually begin? When should someone be considered a human being and enjoy the rights, freedoms and privileges as other humans?
- At the moment of conception
- At the moment the pregnancy is detected
- At the end of the 1st trimester
- Once brain activity has been detected
- At the end of the 2nd trimester
- Once survival outside the womb is viable
- Within one month of expected delivery date
- After the entire body is outside vaginal canal
- After the cord is severed and baby survives
So I was thinking of responding, but I realized my views were much too nuanced.
The question isn't when life begins, but when it is that that life assumes worth. Quite obviously a fetus is alive, as is bacteria. And we don't worry about killing bacteria.
Even with this distinction, I don't think a clear line can be easily drawn. The most I feel I can say with certainty is this:
At the moment of conception, the life has no particular worth;
Near birth, the life does have worth
In between the distinctions are very fuzzy.

Let's throw out one argument off the bat: the argument from potential. Often one will hear the argument "what if the child that's being aborted would've grown up to be Beethoven? Or Einstein?" Well, what if it had grown up to be Hitler or Stalin? Or for all we know it could've ended up being a miscarriage, or a stillbirth, in which case it wouldn't have grown up to be anything at all.
More fundamentally, this argument could easily be used to prove that it's wrong not to have sex when the woman has eggs ready to be fertilized. After all, if the eggs were fertilized, who knows what great things those children could accomplish? Ergo, by the reasoning used earlier, it is a disservice to humanity to not have sex. Reductio ad absurdum.
(If one brings in "God's will", it actually gets even more complicated, since then you have to bring in all the theological issues involving omniscience, omnipotence, and sovereignty.)

Therefore we can only reason in regards to what the embryo/fetus IS, not what it might be. And here is where the worth of it's life get's fuzzy. Because as I said before, we have no problem killing bacteria, which perform many lifelike functions that an embryo does not. And unless we're vegetarian, we're even willing to kill animals that have more sentient behavior than a newborn baby. Obviously the argument hinges on the fact that the embryo is "human", whereas the other things are not. Yet, this is not terribly different from one race of people saying it's OK to kill people of other races, but not members of their own race. Just as the color of one's skin is less important than their qualities of personality, so too whether one belong to the species of Homo Sapien is less important than their human-like qualities in determining whether their life has value (for the benefit of the doubt, I am making the assumption here that the value of life depends on humanness in some form--not necessarily a sound assumption [although I think it's necessary, more on that in another post]). For instance, if by some freak coincidence on genetics, if a chimpanzee was born with the mental abilities of an adult human, we would almost certainly say it deserved human rights, and also that it almost certainly had a soul. But then, how far do we have to go before we say it ceases to have these things? If it has the abilities of a teenager? A child? A toddler? A newborn? In fact, chimps do have abilities beyond those of a young toddler. Why, then, does the toddler have human rights, and a soul, and the chimp does not, even though their abilities are just as "human"? And why should we be concerned with the life of an embryo, but not a bacterium?

(This was written of the cuff, late at night, so I sort of rambled.)

Speech for Church

This is a speech I had to write for a Youth Service at church (www.uua.org). It's a rehashing of earlier posts (I did it at the last minute, as is usually the case with me), but I think it's worth putting up:

I believe that the protection of individual rights is fundamentally important in human ethics. Without this protection, the most well-meaning moralities can quickly evolve into totalitarianism, authoritarianism, fascism, and so on. This is because morality is centered on the promotion of well-being, and it is not immediately obvious that freedom leads to well-being. Obviously it does when contrasted with a semi-lack of freedom, but what about with a total lack of freedom? After all, if our minds were controlled, we could very well be better off. So while a Utilitarian morality of “the greatest good (or happiness) of the greatest number of people” is, I believe, the best morality we have, it MUST include a clause protecting individual rights.
What then is the fundamental right? What makes it so? Obviously, presence in the Bill of Rights does NOT make something a fundamental right. The right to marriage, the right to bare arms, the right to raise one's children as one sees fit, etc., although they may or may not be rights, cannot be FUNDAMENTAL rights either, since they are dependant on other rights and circumstances.
I believe that there must be a fundamental right for each person to pursue their vision of truth and meaning, to advocate their vision of it, and to be given the greatest opportunity to do both. I believe that this right, a right of thought, is absolute, unlike rights of action.
I come tot his belief by the consideration of three premises:
1. It is uncertain if there is such a thing as truth and meaning, although I believe it is likely that there is.
2. If however there is, it is more important than anything else.
3. It is highly unlikely, in fact I believe impossible, for any person or group of people to know all there is to know about truth and meaning.
The first two premises lead me to a sort of "Pascal's Wager" in regards to truth and meaning: the importance of finding it if it does exist far outweigh the benfits (such as comfort) of restricting people in their search for it whether it exists or not.
There exists, however, the possibility that someone who believes they have found total truth and meaning to then insist that everyone else agree with them: religious authoritarianism and dogmatism is an example. So is racism, sexism, and any other form of prejudice. This is where the third premise comes in.
Both of these arguments are essentially saying the same thing: in restricting the pursuit of truth and meaning to serve what is believed to be "truth and meaning", humanity and individuals are prevented from finding what may be even greater truth and meaning. It does not matter how noble the ideas that are being protected are. A dogmatic belief that humans are basically good, or that every human’s life is important, or that genocide is bad, is still a dogmatic belief. It is possible, though perhaps inconceivable, that these ideas could be wrong, or at least incomplete.
It is pointless to have a right to pursue truth and meaning if we do not have access to ideas though. Therefore, as part of a right to pursue truth and meaning, we also must include the right to access to ideas and a right to education, giving us the opportunities to exercise our right. Children must also be educated to have as open a mind as possible, since beliefs formed during childhood are incredibly difficult to shake off, preventing us from the pursuit. And part of having the access to ideas is that all people have the right to advocate their vision of truth. And we must advocate them forcefully, though not through use of force. This is because one’s search for truth must also be responsible. To often people say “these are my beliefs, and I have a right to my beliefs, so leave me alone”. This is nothing more than dogma on a personal level, and can be just as damaging. For me, pursuing truth and meaning means one must constantly be challenging one's own beliefs, constantly submitting them to change and improvement on logical, empirical, and spiritual grounds. It also means not being afraid of having one's beliefs criticized and challenged by others, but instead considering others' arguments and changing one's beliefs appropriately.
With this right and these reponsibilites, we can move forward, and as a species, grow. If there is no truth, than we have lost little. If there is, though, we stand much to gain as the interaction of our many different ideas allows thought to evolve towards the archetype that is ultimate truth.

Freedom of thought and speech

Just expanding on the "Rights" post...
My reason for believing in the absolute right to pursue one's vision of truth and meaning and to advocate that vision stems from three premises:

1. It is uncertain if there is such a thing as truth and meaning, but I believe it is likely that there is.

2. If there is, it is more important than anything else.

3. It is highly unlikely, in fact I believe impossible, for any person or group of people to know all there is to know about truth and meaning.

The first two premises lead me to a sort of "Pascal's Wager" in regards to truth and meaning: the importance of finding it if it does exist far outweigh the benfits (such as comfort) of restricting people in their search for it whether it exists or not.

There exists, however, the possibility that someone who believes they have found total truth and meaning to then insist that everyone else agree with them: religious authoritarianism and dogmatism is an example. This is where the third premise comes in. (Which I must admit is not a premise that has any logical justification other than some arguments from consequence and my own personal feelings. I.e., there is no way to know whether or not someone who claims to have found total truth and meaning is wrong.)

Both of these arguments are essentially saying the same thing: in restricting the pursuit of truth and meaning to serve what is believed to be "truth and meaning" (whether this be religion, comfort, well-being, etc.), humanity and individuals are prevented from finding what may be even greater truth and meaning.

Freedom of advocate one's vision of truth and meaning and to have free and open access to all ideas are also essential, no matter how much they may inconvenience us and make us uncomfortable, since, as stated before, a right to freely pursue truth and meaning is pointless without access to different ideas.

The Fundamental Rights

Since in some earlier posts I've talked about individual rights, let me specify what I believe the fundamental rights to be.
Obviously, presence in the Bill of Rights does NOT make something a fundamental right. The right to marriage, the right to bare arms, the right to raise one's children as one sees fit, etc., although they may or may not be rights, cannot be FUNDAMENTAL rights either, since they are dependant on other rights and circumstances.
(On a side note, "States' Rights" and any other sort of collective right, in my opinion, only exist as long they do not violate individual rights, as collectives are wont to do. This is why I believe one of the functions of federal government should be to make sure that state governments do not violate individual rights, and likewise state governments should make sure county governments and city governments respect individual rights, etc.)

So here's my attempt to define some fundamental rights:

1. The right to freely pursue truth and meaning--and to advocate one's vision of it--and to be given the greatest opportunity to do so. This right is absolute.

2. "The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do so would be wise, or even right...The only part of the conduct of anyone, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign. (John Stuart Mill)" Offense is not a valid form of harm. This right requires more than some qualification.

3. The right to be judged and treated based on individual merits and faults.

(The first two rights are really one right, individual sovereignty, but I divided it into two because while the right to freedom of thought is absolute, the right to freedom of action [without harm to others] becomes necessarily restricted.)

Notes:
The first right's meaning is obvious, although the "opportunity to do so..." part requires some explanation: a right to pursue truth and meaning is useless if one's access to ideas is restricted. Therefore, as part of a right to pursue truth and meaning, we also must include the right to access to ideas and a right to education, both of which are implied by the "opportunity to do so...".
(Getting into murkier territory, it is also my opinion that this right extends to children, since beliefs formed during childhood are very hard to shake off, which is a barrier to a pursuit of truth and meaning. But this also ends up requiring much qualification.)
Also, it should be noted that this right implies all of the rights enumerated in the First Amendment of the Constitution, as well as the right to the "Pursuit of Happiness" (if happiness is the individuals idea of meaning). The right to not be killed is also implied, since it's hard to pursue anything if you're dead ;-)

The second right will require a discussion of it's own.

If the third right seems a little confusing, just add "instead of being judged and treated based on race, gender, nationality, class, sexuality, etc."

Utilitarianism

It is my belief that human beings do things for one of two reasons: pleasure or impulse/habit. Let me specify: by "pleasure" I mean only what they BELIEVE will cause them more pleasure than pain (however human beings are often quite horrid at making such judgements), and it is also the case that even though they may rationally believe that something will more pain than pleasure in the long term--such as drug use--nevertheless for psychological reasons the short-term net pleasure outweighs the long-term net pain. Indeed, all such pleasure/pain decisions are ultimately made in regards to how they make us feel right now, in the immediate future.
(And though it's irrelevant to this argument, by "impulse/habit" I mean those actions that come from no decision, such as reflex actions.)
Many would argue at this point that many times people resist doing what they believe will cause them the most pleasure because it is "wrong". But it seems to me that in cases like this the decision is made on the basis of net pleasure: when we avoid doing something we really want to do because it's "wrong", we are responding to something within us that we believe would cause us to experience pain in response to the "wrongness", and we find that this pain outweighs any potential pleasure. The inverse is true when we do something we would rather not because it's "right": we decide that the pain that would result from NOT doing what's right is greater than the pleasure. (By the way, "right" depends on one's value system, so for instant rationalists behave rationally because to not do so would violate their value system, causing pain.)
Some people get very upset at this point and say "does that mean that the only reason we are altruistic is because it makes us feel better?" to which I say: yes. However, there's an assumption here which I do not understand: the idea that there's something wrong with us performing altruistic actions because they make us feel good. What's in the least bit wrong with the fact that doing good things for other people makes us ourselves feel good? It seems to me that this is a great confirmation of the goodness of human nature!
(By the way, in regards to self-destructive behavior, once again my contention is that the pain is outweighed by the psycholgocial pleasure, or is outweighed by the pain that would be caused by not giving in to compulsion.)
That is my explanation of individual motivation. Now onto it's implications for ethics, which is utilitarianism. "What is good is what will ultimately cause the greatest amount of net pleasure for the greatest number of entities." (I use "entities" so that this definition can include pleasure beyond hat of human beings.) I am humbly following John Stuart Mill here, but adding a lot of my own touches.
First let me defend my assertion that pleasure=good. My observation is that this is, in fact, what human beings already believe, although perhaps not consciously. Consider: can you think of a single thing that is considered "good" that is not expected to cause pleasure? If we give medicine to people it's because we expect that it will cause them long-term pleasure (and this belief causes us pleasure). If we save someone's life it's because we believe that living is somehow more pleasurable than dying (and once again, when with this belief in mind we save someone's life, it makes us feel good). If someone is a selfish psychopath and considers killing people "good" it is only because, being incapable of taking others' pain into account, they derive pleasure from it. If people believe abortions are OK it is because they believe the potential pain of the mother is more important to avoid than the potential pain of the fetus (which may not even exist); if they are against abortion it's because they believe the opposite (this is a massive oversimplification of the issue, by the way). If someone tries to get people to turn to Christ it is because they believe that this will cause those people more long term pleasure when they are saved.
(Religion, in fact, depends on a certain hedonism, since all religions I know of offer some sort of ultimate reward and/or punishment to support their claims that you should do this and not that. Even religious people who are not concerned with this ultimate reward still behave in the way proscribed by their faith because to do otherwise would cause net pain.)
"The greatest pleasure for the greatest number of entities." The "greatest number of entities" part is a bit harder to justify, except that I once again believe it is a natural belief of humanity, and also I believe it is a logical consequence of hedonism if one recognizes the fuzziness of "self" (to be discussed in some future post).
Finally, I am not sure I believe Utilitarianism to be the ultimate form of morality, but I do believe it is an important part. I also think that it is of ultimate importance to qualify utilitarianism with a fundamental respect of individual rights, since otherwise it is very easy for forms of society such as dictatorships, fascist, communist, etc., to be justified. Of primary concern is the right to freedom of thought and speech, for reasons enumerated in my "Old FaceBook Note: My thoughts on the UU principles (for my fellow UUs)- Part 2", and also for more epistomolgical reasons which I will discuss later.

Old FaceBook Note: My thoughts on the UU principles (for my fellow UUs)- Part 2

For UU info: www.uua.org.

For me, the most important principle is "The free and responsible search for truth and meaning". It is adherence to this principle that prevents Unitarian-Universalism from developing any sort of dogma. For instance, while the principle of "The inherent worth and dignity and each and every person" is a good principle, indeed probably THE most undeniably sacred principle we have (excluding, of course, the free and responsible search for truth and meaning), nevertheless it is theoretically possible that this principle is, in fact, "false" (in quotations because it is impossible for a value judgement such as "worth" to be strictly false), and if contemplation, revelation, and experience reveal it to be false, we need to be able to reject it through the free and responsible search for truth and meaning.(The Inherent Worth principle is an interesting example because, even though it is less important in my mind than the Free and Responsible Search princple, nevertheless the latter, in many ways, depends on the former.)This principle also prevents us from enforcing a viewpoint, however noble it may be, on individuals within our community (and in the world at large)--and that we cannot deny them participation in the community--once again, avoiding dogma (as you may be able to tell, I approach these questions from an individualistic perspective). At the same time, it prevents the individual from enforcing THEIR viewpoint. (Although in both these cases, it is important to be pragmatic: sometimes [indeed usually] the needs of the community require that we enforce some sort of practical viewpoint, usually about proper behavior, to ensure that things run smoothly).However, this does NOT mean that we shouldn't advocate our viewpoints, as a community and as individuals, and advocating them forcefully (but not through use of force) when there is a need to do so. This is because the one's search for truth and meaning has to be free AND responsible. To often the responsibility part is forgotten. UUism is accused by others as being a religion where "you can believe anything you want", and I think often even we as UUs also think that we CAN believe whatever we want. But that is not, in my opinion, responsible. For me, being responsible in one's search for truth and meaning means constantly challenging one's own beliefs, constantly submitting them to change and improvement, on logical, empirical, and spiritual grounds. It also means not being afraid of having one's beliefs criticized and challenged by others, but instead considering others' arguments and changing one's beliefs appropriately. On my part, I try to distrust any comfortably held belief. I also believe I have the right to challenge the beliefs of others, not because I want to convince them of the rightness, necessarily, of my beliefs (although being human, especially a teenage human, it's unlikely I am anything approaching pure in this regard [or any for regards for that matter]), but because I want to "rock the boat" a little, and get them thinking. (Obviously it is unfair for me to insist on challenging the beliefs of someone who is equally insistant that they want me to stop doing so.) There is something that one of the people who ran the "Coming of Age" thing said that sticks with me: "it's not that one has the right to their beliefs, but that they have the right to DEFEND their beliefs".

Cultural Relativism

First, let me specify that, when talking about cultural relativism, I am specifically referring to morality.

Now, it is difficult for me to argue against cultural relativism, since being an agnostic/atheist I do not have an easy way to apply some sort of cultural standard in it's place. I will, however, try to argue for my own personal standard shortly.

First, the simplest problem. This is the most obvious problem that pretty much everyone who thinks about such things seems to have thought about: if all cultural viewpoints are equally valid, what about those viewpoints that deny the validity of other viewpoints? What about the viewpoints that say that cultural relativism itself is incorrect? It seems to me that the very assertion of relativism is self-contradicting.

This is not the gravest problem I see with cultural relativism, though. A greater problem is: how do we define a culture? For instance, if we say that political repression in China should be accepted because it's their culture, why are we then excluding from our definition of that culture those citizens that argue against repression? Or that in some countries women are considered inferior, and we should accept that as a culural value, why do we exclude the women who try to break free? (These statements are hinting at my proposed cultural standard, by the way...) So far we've considered situations where the minority of a culture is ignored; we can also consider the opposite case, where a minority or slim majority is considered to represent a culture. For instance, does political repression in China, in fact, represent the majority culture, or is it the culture of those who rule? And where does one culture end and another begin? What about sub-cultures? And finally, what if one culture's values entail the destruction/repression of another culture, aka Nazi Germany, or the slave-owning South. Do we allow this to go on? These are important questions to consider if we are going to making judgements based on the concept of cultural relativism.

What, then, is the alternative? As I mentioned, one of the difficulties of cultural relativism is where one draws borders between cultures. Is there some level where a line can be clearly drawn? The clearest line that can be drawn is around individuals. I believe that the fundamental standard we can apply to cultures is the degree to which they respect individual rights (which I will enumerate my concept of in a future post). (Say hello to my civil libertarian tendencies!) Now, if an individual chooses to hand over their individual rights, that is their perogative, but one right must then still remain: the right of choice. Individuals must be able to freely choose to associate and follow a culture. If they choose to be a part of a repressive culture, that's fine, but they cannot be allowed to then insist that others also do so.
This also means that there must be one more standard: information and ideas must be freely available within the culture, since the right to choose is useless and pointless if there are no choices. And I personally believe, but this is getting into mcuh more difficult territory, that children in particular must be given as many choices and ideas as possible, since it's in childhood that one identifies with particular cultures and values.