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19 years old. Homeschooled, then went to a community college instead of high school. Currently at Hampshire College. http://www.facebook.com/NamelessWonderBand http://myspace.com/namelesswondermusic http://youtube.com/namelesswonderband http://twitter.com/NamelessWonder7 http://www.youtube.com/dervine7 http://ted.com/profiles/778985

Tuesday, February 22, 2011

Why did I think this post was a good idea?

So I decided it would be worthwhile to check out the stats on my blog.

Search Keywords that got people here:

All Time
  1. dervine7.blogspot.com
  2. peter benzi
  3. sandra pettinico
  4. taliesin nyala
  5. "richard wayne lee" or "lee, richard wayne" strained bedfellows
  6. nvcc homeschool pdf connecticut
  7. patricia pallis
  8. peter benzi nvcc
  9. petr benzi
  10. "douglas hofstadter" utilitarianism
All pretty predicatble. Stuff I've mentioned in my posts (especially the teachers I mentioned in my commencement speech). It's mildly interesting that 2 people apparently got to my blog looking for the article by Richard Wayne Lee that I cited. But who is this Taliesin Nyala? Turns out that she's an Alum of Hampshire, and she shows up on my page because I follow the Culture, Brain, and Development blog. Which makes these next keyword stats very confusing...

Past Month
  1. dervine7.blogspot.com
  2. "taliesin nyala"
  3. agent hujinikabolokov
  4. religious humanism strained bedfellows pagans
  5. taliesin nyala how pleasure works
  6. taliesin nyala naked
  7. taliesin nyala sex
Your guess is as good as mine. Especially as if you search those last two the only website you get that has ALL those words in it is mine! ("naked" appears in my blog post about the sayings of Jesus, and "sex" appears in my favorite quotations)

(By the way, Agent Hujinikabolokov is from Sleep Talkin' Man.)

Referring Sites

Actually, never mind. This wasn't a terribly interesting blog post to begin with and now it's 2:24AM. Except for uupdates.net
and Facebook, the referring sites just a bunch of referral spam (I'm guessing porn), which is mildly depressing. From Russia, it seems. Although I have been getting a lot more views from Facebook recently, which means my friends are looking at this blog, which is cool! Speaking of Russia, that spam makes it so that they are one of the top countries to view this blog. So there you go.

Thursday, February 17, 2011

EXCITING DEVELOPMENTS!

I'm going to start trying to post regularly! I'm sure that for all of you guys who check this blog regularly only to be disappointed by the lack of, well, blogging, this will once again fill your lives with meaning...

OK, so the title of this blog is hyperbolic. Which leads to the second development, which is that I realized my blog was distinctly serious and formal. Which is odd, because I have a distinct lack of seriousness and formality. So, more silliness.



So......yeah. That's the story.

Wednesday, February 16, 2011

Doodled this during a class...

The Turing Test

Hampshire College
Philosophy of Mind

The Turing Test involves the following procedure: a person, the interrogator, is talking to both a machine, designed to imitate a human, and to an actual human. (The communication is entirely through text.) The interrogator’s job is to determine what is the human and what is the machine. If no interrogator can determine which is which, the machine is judged to be thinking. Is this accurate? In this paper, I will argue that it is, because we can only judge thought based on behavior, and if the behavior of the machine is identical to a human’s but the machine is not thinking, we must doubt the existence of human thought.

When discussing the Turing Test, it is important to make a distinction between what we can measure and the “inner nature”, so to speak, of that which we are measuring. The discussion then involves two questions: by what criteria are we to judge something as thinking, and is that thing, in fact, thinking?

In regards to the first question, let’s begin with considering the method that we, in fact, employ, before moving on to the method we ought to employ. I.e., how is it that we naturally determine that some particular thing in our environment is thinking? A first answer to this question might be that we ascribe thought to other members of the human race, and nothing else. This will not do, however, as we often say that certain humans lack thought: definitely if they are brain dead, for instance, and more controversially if they are mentally handicapped or a child. And although there are no non-controversial examples of non-humans thinking in our experience, we nevertheless have no problem imagining that non-human beings, such as extraterrestrials—that have no genetic or physiological resemblance to us (or, in some cases, no physiology at all)—could nevertheless think. Also, it seems that we often ascribe thought to non-human animals of which we do have experience, i.e., “the dog is thinking about where to hide its bone”. Perhaps in this later case we use “thinking” as a figure of speech, a sort of shortcut for “acting as if they are thinking”. But why then do we not say that when we talk of other humans “thinking” we are using the same shortcut? After all, we do not perceive thoughts (except for our own)—we perceive their manifestations, the acting-as-ifs. For those who need to be convinced of this fact, consider the following thought experiment.

Suppose that someone had been rendered completely incapable of moving any part of his/her body, either through nerve damage or some sort of outside force: furthermore, the parts of his/her nervous system that we believe are responsible for thought have been hidden from us in some way (perhaps encased in some material which is opaque to any sort of scan), so that we cannot determine whether they are active or damaged. (We could also suppose that there has been no damage to the nerves carrying signals to their brain, if this supposition is deemed necessary.) It is undeniable that this person could be thinking: victims of temporary paralysis can describe the experiences and thoughts they had while they were paralyzed. But it would be completely impossible for us determine whether this person is, in fact, thinking.

So how do we naturally determine whether other things in our environment are thinking? The examples given of brain-dead individuals and aliens make it apparent that this judgment is not ultimately made on the basis of belonging to a certain species, human. It may be initially made on that basis—we probably have an instinctual tendency to ascribe thought to any other human we meet and ascribe a lack of thought to any non human (for example, on encountering a brain-dead individual we might assume he/she is aware until we find out their condition, or in meeting a sufficiently strange alien we might assume it’s just a non-thinking creature until we learn more about it)—but it isn’t ultimately made on it. Instead, we make this judgment based on whether the thing behaves in a way that appears to indicate thought.[1] Furthermore, the example in the thought experiment above makes it clear that this is the only way that we can make this judgment; and, pragmatically, it is the way that we ought to make this judgment. This means that for a machine that passes the Turing Test we should judge it to be thinking: it is behaving exactly like a human, human’s think, therefore it is behaving in the sort of way that indicates thought—and if from these facts we do not infer that machine is thinking, then we are holding it to a different standard than the other things about which we make such judgments.

Now we move on to the second question. Does our judgment, made for pragmatic reasons, reflect actual reality? Is the machine, in fact, thinking?

It is useful now to define exactly what we mean by “thinking”. Turing’s definition[2] is that the sort of thing that thinks is the sort of thing that passes the Turing Test, a definition which is useful for him as a computer scientist interested in what computers can do but not very useful for philosophers of mind, as the definition makes it tautological that a machine which passes the Turing Test is thinking. For our purposes, I propose the following definition: something is thinking when the part of it responsible for thought is manipulating models of the world (which are not physical models), and when it has a subjective, qualitative awareness of the models and manipulations that it is performing on them. The first part of the definition comes from the fact that one of the things that distinguishes thought from non-thought is that while the latter consists of observably deterministic responses to force and/or stimulus and in solving problems purely by trial and error behavior (randomly producing behavior until something works), the former consists of considering the best course of behavior before doing anything, and this consideration is made by the thinking thing modeling the situation and then running through the possible solutions, noting what those different solutions do within the model—observationally, this means that something that acts as if it thinks can look at a puzzle and then proceed to quickly (relative to trial-and-error) perform the solution. This is how we, who are thinking things, behave, and it is a major part of the acting-as-if by which we judge that other things are thinking. However, the second part of this definition is important, as there are many things that manipulate models of the world that may not be thinking: any computer would fall under this category. The second part of the definition is more essential to our question, as we are making the distinction between what we can measure and the “inner nature” of that which we are measuring. Because of this, it is important to specify that the subjective awareness be qualitative, i.e., that there is something that “it is like”, so to speak, for the thing to be aware of what it’s doing—as computers can monitor and analyze their own internal processes and still not be considered to be thinking.

However, the fact that computers can do this might mean that there is something “it is like” and we just do not realize it. For this reason I will not ask the general question about what sorts of computers could think, but the specific question of whether the sort of computer that can pass the Turing Test thinks; I’m concerned with whether passing the Turing Test is sufficient for allowing us to infer thought, not whether it is necessary.[3]

We are now ready to answer the question: is the machine that passes the Turing Test thinking? We have shown that if we are to judge whether it is thinking the way that we judge whether other things are thinking, we must judge it to be thinking. And based on the facts considered so far, I believe that our judgment would be accurate. The machine that passes the Turing Test is the machine that perfectly imitates human behavior. If it is not, in fact, thinking, then humans that pass the Turing Test would not have to be thinking either. Thinking would not have any explanatory force or necessary connection to behavior, and we therefore would have no reason to assume its existence. Furthermore, it could be argued that if the machine is not thinking, humans must not be thinking, as we have a case of two things that are behaving in an identical manner and therefore it would seem that any phenomenon produced by one must be produced by the other (even if the phenomenon looks different: for example the same program run on my Mac plays music, whereas if it were run on a mechanical computer it does not). If the machine that passes the Turing Test is not thinking, then solipsism becomes a truly viable option: and this, I think, is a conclusion no reasonable person wants to accept.





[1] One who objects to this assertion might bring this up the case of the paralyzed patient who, while not exhibiting any behavior, nevertheless exhibits certain brain activity from which we infer that he/she is thinking. However, the only reason that we can make this inference is that that sort of activity is normally associated with thought-exhibiting behavior: if we had not observed such a correlation, we would not know what, if anything, the brain activity indicated. We can also imagine that a neurological (or whatever word we’d use for the study of the part of the alien involved in cognition) examination of a thinking alien might reveal completely different sorts of activity. Therefore, my assertion can be easily extended to say that, in cases where we cannot make judgments based on behavior, we can infer thought if the thing we’re dealing with exhibits some observable phenomena that is normally correlated with thought-exhibiting behavior amongst examples of that thing (if examples of that thing engage in thought-exhibiting behavior).

[2] “Computing Machinery and Intelligence”, pg. 3

[3] Indeed, it is not necessary: our paralyzed patient from the earlier thought experiment would not pass it, although he/she is thinking. It is also possibly that a beings with a higher level of thought than our own would fail it: the sorts of things they might say might appear to us to be total gibberish.

Proof

Hampshire College
Low-Tech Computing

Prove: there are as many even numbers as there are natural numbers.

Proof: any even number can be divided by 2 and the result is one unique natural number, and any natural number can be multiplied by 2 and the result is an even number. Therefore, every even number has a corresponding natural number and there are no natural numbers that do not have a corresponding even number. If there were not as many even numbers as there are natural numbers, then there would have to be some natural number that could not be multiplied by 2 to get an even number, or an even number that, when divided by 2, produced more than one natural number. Neither of these are the case. Therefore, there are as many even numbers as there are natural numbers. ☺

Analysis "They're Made of Meat"

Hampshire College
Philosophy of Mind

Terry Bisson’s “They’re Made of Meat” raises the dual issues of the seeming disconnect between our physical baseness and our mental capacities, and of human chauvinism. In regards to the first question, we are made to see the seeming absurdity in modern cognitive neuroscience, in that “meat”, the same stuff that constitutes a hamburger, is understood to give rise to the mental life that we value so much. It is interesting, however, that the other, normal, non-meat creatures that the narrators discuss are also physical beings, although of a different sort than the “meat” on earth. Therefore, intelligence is still ultimately based in physical processes, such as the dynamics of an electron plasma. Because of this, “Meat” does not in fact suggest that the mind cannot be the result of physical processes, unless it makes that suggestion through the irony of having beings whose minds arise from physical processes alien to us finding the physical processes that our minds arise from bizarre.
This brings us the second issue, that of human chauvinism. We, humans, assume that if we find intelligent beings elsewhere in the universe, they will be, fundamentally, the same as us. (There are even those, such as John Searle in his essay “Minds, Brains, and Programs”, who seem to suggest [however vaguely] that mental processes can only arise from the sort of physical processes that happen in the human brain.) The story’s challenge to human chauvinism only goes so far, however, as the minds of the narrators and the non-meat beings they encounter still seem to work the same way as our own, just with a different underlying physical structure (which brings up a whole new set of issues and questions about the relationship between the mind and the physical to be discussed at some other time). Indeed, their minds are similar enough to our own that contact is possible, and while it seems we might not find them if we were looking for extraterrestrial biology similar to our own, it still seems that we would recognize their activities as carrying the stamp of intelligence (the situation is the same for the narrators of the story in regards to us: they could recognize the radio signals we produce as coming from intelligent beings). As such, “Meat” does not really confront us with the possibility of minds that are unrecognizable to us as such; we are not presented with odd situations such as Jupiter having a subjective life that arises out of the dynamics of its atmosphere, or a light bulb experiencing being on or off, or the interactions of the entire human race producing a mind of which we are as unaware and incapable of understanding as individual neurons are of our own minds. Of course, this would be an extraordinarily difficult story to write; and it would be similarly difficult, possibly even impossible, for us as humans to find such minds. And so, while being careful not to look only for physical life that is like our own, in regards to extraterrestrial intelligence we would have to rely on a sort of Turing Test: are the sorts of things it’s doing the sort of things we do? If so, then regardless of how exactly it works, we would seem to have discovered a mind elsewhere in the universe.

Personal Pronouns

Hampshire College Psychology of Language Introduction Consider the following statement: “You asked me to go to the store to pick up some eggs for grandma. I picked them up for her.” For a normal adult speaker of English, this sentence is completely comprehensible; furthermore, it is a statement that would be easily and naturally produced. However, imagine that you are an alien with no understanding of English. Your English-speaking companion makes this statement, helpfully pointing at you when she says “you”, herself when she says “me” and “I”, and grandma when she says “her”. After a few conversations like this, you think you have gotten the hang of English. Walking up to your companion (who is sick at home) after giving grandma a ride, you proudly state: “You drove grandma to the store. Her picked up some eggs for her. Oh! Are I sick? You hope me get better!” From a theoretical standpoint, pronouns should be hard, and it is remarkable children can use them properly. When using pronouns, one must decide what 1. person & gender to use (are you talking about yourself [1st Person]: “I/me/my/mine”; to someone else [2nd Person]: “you/your/yours”; or about someone else entirely [3rd Person]: “he/him/his/she/her/hers/it/its”? In regards to 3rd Person, is the referent a person [“he/she”] or an object [“it’], and is it male or female?) and what 2. case to use (what function does the pronoun have in the sentence? Is the sentence about something the referent does [Nominative, Subjective]: “I/you/he/she/it”; something that is being done to the referent [Objective]: “me/you/her/him/it”; describing something as the property of the referent [Adjectival Genitive] or naming it as such [Nominal Genitive]: “my/your/his/her/its” or “mine/your/his/hers/its”; or something the referent is doing to itself [Reflexive]: “myself/yourself/himself/herself/itself”) and whether you are talking about one person or thing or more than one person or thing. You must also realize that although you can freely interchange 3P pronouns and names, it is not acceptable to refer to yourself or the person you are talking to by name (Chiat, 1986). The issues that will be focused on in this paper are those related to shifting reference, pronoun reversal, and the use of names or pronouns amongst typically developing children and children with autism. Shifting reference Most words name things: more importantly, they always name the same thing. A table is a table, Mr. Jones is Mr. Jones, the teacher is the teacher, regardless of whether you are talking, your friend is talking, you are reading a book, etc. One thing might have multiple names, or one name might signify multiple things, but the meaning of the name does not change depending on who is speaking (Clark 1978; Fay and Schuler, 1980; Ricard et al., 1999). Children learning a language must comprehend, through some means, that the person the words “you”, “I”, or “me” refer to changes depending on who is speaking to whom (Bates, 1990; Chiat, 1986; Clark, 1978; Ricard, Girouard, and Gouin-Decarie, 1999). How do children understand these rules? This question has intrigued psycholinguists for some time in regards to the light in might show on the connections between language, the conceptions of self and other, and theory of mind. Charney (1980) noted three ways in which children might understand pronouns: speech-role referring, person referring, and person-in-speech-role-referring. In a role-referring understanding, the child correctly understands the pronouns to refer to different members of the discourse depending on who is speaking. This understanding requires that the child have some sort of non-egocentrism, allowing it to take the point of view of others. In a person-referring understanding, the child understands the pronouns as a sort of name (see below). In a person-in-speech-role understanding, the child learns the pronouns most relevant to itself. The child understands pronouns in relation to the child’s own speech roles, i.e., it understands that “I” refers to it when it is speaking, but may not understand that “I” refers to others when they are speaking. This last theory is the one Charney supports. Pronoun use by typically developing children A natural assumption would be that children, on hearing themselves referred to as “you” and their parents referring to themselves as “I”, would assume that these terms are a type of name (Clark, 1976): our alien in the introduction made precisely this type of error. The child would assume that it is “you” and either its parent or adults in general are “I”. This phenomenon has been referred to as “pronoun reversal” (although “nonreversal” might be a more accurate term [Fay and Schuler, 1980; Fay, 1982], as the error in fact stems from the child not reversing pronouns to accommodate speaker roles). Interestingly, pronoun errors of this type are rare; even more interestingly, despite their rarity they are still found amongst typically developing children, often enough to be well documented in the literature (Clark 1978; Cruttenden, 1977; Chiat, 1986). According to Bates “it is quite common at age twenty to twenty-four months for a child to say ‘carry you/hold you/help you’ to mean ‘carry me/hold me/help me’” (1990). Cooley (1908) noted in a diary study that his third daughter would use “she” and “I” to refer to herself from the age of 1;11-2;3, such as in the statement “I carry you”, expressing the desire to be carried. Inconsistent reversals were also noted, such as “I want to take a walk with me”. Chiat (1981) performed a case study in 3 sessions with the subject, Matthew. The sessions took place at ages 2;4.16, 2;4.24, and 2;5.11, and Matthew’s comprehension and production were tested, the latter naturalistically in the 2nd session and with some attempts to elicit pronouns in the third. In the second session, Matthew’s use of 1P pronouns was usually correct, but he almost never used the correct pronoun for the addressee, as in the examples “I cry”=you’ll cry. This was particularly true in possessive contexts, such as “That my umbrella”=that’s your umbrella. 2P pronouns were used to refer to himself, as in “You’ll cry”=I’ll cry. Also, pronouns were occasionally inconsistent, with both the correct and incorrect forms used in a single utterance, similarly to Cooley’s observations. In the 3rd session, reversals of pronouns in regards to the addressee were still present, but had become rare, with Matthew often correcting himself. Despite these errors in production, Matthew’s performance on tests of comprehension was perfect. In a cross-sectional and longitudinal study by Loveland (1984) a correlation was found between mastery of different spatial points of view and pronoun errors, with some reversal errors observed amongst those children who did not understand different points of view. These errors often happened in contexts where the child was asked a question and repeated the pronoun used, e.g. “What do I have?” “I have cup”. Errors in comprehension were noted. Jordan (1989), in a comparison of autistic, typical, and mentally handicapped children, noted errors made by a few of the typical children in comprehension and production, with two typical children misunderstanding “you” as referring to the speaker and 3 children making errors in the production of “you”, one of them also making an error in the production of “me”. Oshima-Takane’s (1992) case study followed a pronoun reversing child, David, from age 1;11-2;10. The data they collected were his performance on comprehension tasks, 45-minute to 2 hour samples of his speech, and information from interviews with his mother and babysitter. At age 1;11 David’s mother had noticed that he was making consistent pronominal errors. At that time, he would use 1P pronouns to refer to the addressee 94% of the time and 2P pronouns to refer to himself 100% of the time. By the age of 2;10 his errors had almost completely disappeared. However, the development of the correct use of 1P and 2P pronouns was significantly different: while the error rate for 1P pronouns declined regularly between the 2;4-2;10, the error rate for 2P pronouns remained pretty much constant until 2;8, dropping dramatically between 2;8 and 2;10. In regards to comprehension, up until 2;4 he understood “you” as referring to himself even when he wasn’t the one being addressed. Oshima-Takane attributed David’s errors to a lack of experience with people using pronouns when talking to each other and not to him, making it difficult for him to generalize. Fraiberg and Adelson (1977) noted that blind children, capable in all other respects, often reversed pronouns well into their 5th year, which she attributed to the difficulties of forming a concept of self without the visual modality. And, in perhaps the most striking example of pronoun reversal, a deaf child was noted to make reversal errors in pointing, even interpreting all “you” signs as referring to herself (Bates 1990)! However, as stated before, pronoun errors are exceedingly rare amongst typically developing children (Huxley, 1970; Charney, 1980). Much more commonly, children will use names instead of pronouns. This might reflect a confusion about pronouns that causes the child to avoid them altogether, as evidenced by the fact that children who use names master pronouns more quickly when they begin to use them (Bates, 1990)—suggesting these children were using the time to work out what pronouns actually mean. It might also be caused by the fact that the nominal style is what the child often hears, as parents will often use names in order to effectively get the child’s attention (Chiat, 1986; Bates, 1990). Interestingly, there seems to be a distinction in the child’s use of names vs. pronouns when they use both, where the name refers to the physical body and the 1P pronoun to the self as an actor (Cooley, 1908). Autism and personal pronouns Whereas pronoun reversal is rare amongst typically developing children, amongst autistic children it is common enough that it is often considered pathognomic of the disorder (Jordan, 1989; Hobson, 1990). As Kanner wrote (qtd. in Lee et. Al., 1994): Personal pronouns are repeated just as heard, with no change to suit the altered situation. The child, once told by his mother “Now I will give you your milk,” expresses the desire for milk in exactly the same words. Consequently, he comes to speak of himself always as “you,” and of the person addressed as “I”. What Kanner described here is the phenomenon of echolalia, where the autistic child associates statements with the situation as they, the child, perceive it, and not with the parent’s mental state or intentions (Charney, 1981; Hobson, 1990). It is also possible that the child’s errors may be traced to their difficulties in gestural behavior and joint attention (Fay and Schuler, 1980). Autistic difficulties with pronouns are well documented in the literature (Fay and Schuler, 1980). Jordan (1989) found that while errors were rare amongst typical and mentally handicapped children, 9 out of the 11 autistic children made the maximum number of possible errors in the experiment in the production of both 1P and 2P pronouns. 3 of these children made pronoun reversals. The autistic children were also much more likely to use a name instead of “you”, while their results for names vs. pronouns in referring to themselves were more scattered. One child used her name 3 times and the experimenter’s names 7 times for “you”, with the numbers being reversed for “me”, indicating confusion about identity. Lee et al. (1994) found, in preparation for their study, that teachers reported several cases of pronoun reversal amongst autistic students, such as the student who told a teacher on return from sick leave “I’m better now”. Lee et al. (1994), in comparing autistic children with other mentally disabled children, found a tendency amongst autistic children to use proper names instead of the pronouns “I”, “me”, and “you”, that was not found amongst the other children. There was also a tendency to use the pronoun “I” instead of “me”. There were however no significant cases of pronoun reversal, although two autistic subjects did respond to the question “who can see X?” with the response “I can’t” as opposed to “you can”. Strangely, though, one of the subjects who had performed capably throughout the experiment said, on leaving, “Thank you for seeing you, Tony”. Lee et al. interpreted these results to a lack of a sense of “me-ness” or “you-ness”: the autistic subjects, according to their interpretation, lacked the sense of self (and other) as actor that Cooley (1908) had described. This also could explain why those autistic subjects who performed well could still experience occasional lapses, and their use of names for pictures of themselves and others. Proposal for future studies The fact that pronominal errors are rare amongst typically developing children means that systematic, large-scale experiments have rarely been done. Most information on personal pronoun difficulties has come, instead, from detailed case studies. Strangely, though, I did not encounter such case studies in regards to autistic children. I propose that such a study be performed, testing both production and comprehension. Diary studies such as Cooley’s (1908) would also be insightful. This would allow for a comparison between the pronoun use of otherwise typically developing children with pronominal errors and autistic children with pronominal errors. As the cognitive reasons for the errors made by autistic children are fairly easily understood but the cognitive reasons that some children should reverse pronouns when they have the same capabilities as their peers are not, such a comparison could shed light on the latter. For example, it could distinguish whether the reasons for pronoun errors amongst typically developing children are primarily cognitive or based on abnormal experience of pronoun use (as Oshima-Takane [1992]) suggests. It would also give a more in depth understanding of autistic pronouns. References Bates, E. (1990). Language about me and you: pronominal reference and the emerging concept of self. In, D. Cicchetti and M. Beeghly (Eds.), The Self in transition: infancy to childhood (165-182). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Charney, R. (1980). Speech roles and the development of personal pronouns. Journal of Child Language, 7, 509-528. Charney, R. (1981). Pronoun errors in autistic children-support for a social explanation. British Joumal of Disorders of Communication, 15(1), 39-43. Chiat, S. (1981). If I were you and you were me-the analysis of pronouns in a pronoun- reversing child. Journal of Child Language, 9, 359-379. Chiat, S. (1986). Personal pronouns. In, P. Fletcher and M. Garman (Eds.), Language acquisition: studies in first language acquisition, 2nd Ed. (339-355). New York: Cambridge University Press. Clark, E. (1978). From gesture to word: on the natural history of deixis in language acquisition. In, J. Bruner and A. Garton (Eds.), Human growth & development: Wolfson College Lectures, 1976 (85-120). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cooley, C. H. (1908). A study of the early use of self-words by a child. The Psychological Review, 15(6), 339-57. Cruttenden, A. (1977). The acquisition of personal pronouns and language 'simplification'. Language and Speech, 20(3), 191-197. Fay, W.H., & Schuler, A. L. (1980). Emerging language in autistic children. Baltimore: University Park Press. Fraiberg, S. & Adelson, E. (1977). Self-representation in language and play. In, S. Fraiberg, Insights from the blind (248-270). New York: Basic Books, Inc. Hobson, R. P. (1990). On the origins of self and the case of autism. Development and Psychopathology, 2, 163-181. Huxley, R. (1970). The development of the correct use of subject personal pronouns in two children. In, G. B. Flores d'Arcais & W. J. M. Levelt (Eds.), Advances in psycholinguistics. New York: American Elsevier Publishing Company, Inc. Jordan, R. R. (1989). An experimental comparison of the understanding and use of speaker-addressee personal pronouns in autistic children. British Journal of Disorders of Communication, 24, 169-179. Lee, A., Hobson, R., & Chiat, S. (1994). I, you, me, and autism: An experimental study. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 24(2), 155-176. Loveland, K. A. (1984). Learning about points of view- spatial perspective and the acquisition of 'I/you'. Journal of Child Language, 11, 535-556. Oshima-Takane, Y. (1992). Analysis of pronominal errors-a case study. Journal of Child Language, 19, 11-131. Ricard, M., Girouard, C. P., & Gouin-Decarie, T. (1999). Personal pronouns and perspective taking in toddlers. Journal of Child Language, 26, 681-697.